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WHY ARE PRICES STICKY? 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM AN INTERVIEW STUDY 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reports preliminary results from a large research 
project on business pricing which is currently underway.  The 
idea is to use interviews with actual price setters to assess the 
validity of a dozen theories of price stickiness.  The rather 
unorthodox  (for economists) methodology is defended; the research 
design is described briefly; and a few results based on the first 
72 interviews  (out of a projected 200)  are presented.  This 
sample suggests that the median firm changes its  price annually 
and that price adjustments typically lag 3-4 months behind shocks 
to demand or cost. 
Alan S. Blinder 
Department of Economics 
Princeton University 
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021 Those of us who teach Keynesian economics——an  increasing 
number these  days,  it seems——attach  great importance  to the 
phenomenon of wage  and/or price "stickiness.'  It explains,  for 
example,  why recessions  cure themselves  only  slowly and why 
changes  in the money supply have real effects.  In fact,  Keynesian 
economics  is sometimes characterized  as the economics  of nominal 
rigidities; the theoretical  link from aggregate  demand to 
employment,  say, is hard  to forge without them. Yet, more than a 
half-century after Keynes published The General Theory, the 
phenomenon  itself remains poorly understood. Just why are wages 
or prices sticky? 
It is not that economists have ignored these questions. One 
could literally  fill many  volumes with good empirical  studies of 
wage and price stickiness, and many more with  clever  theories 
purporting to explain these  phenomena. Yet, despite  all this 
work, the range of admissible theories is wider  than ever, and 
new theories  continue to crop up faster than old ones are 
rejected.  (The study I am about to describe,  for example,  tests 
12 theories;  and my list is not exhaustive.) This  lack of 
scientific progress makes  one wonder about the basic  research 
strategy that economists have been pursuing. Is there  a better 
way? 
In Section I, I argue that traditional research strategies 
may  be unpromising  vehicles  for learning about why prices are 
sticky; the time may have come to entertain new  arid unorthodox 
approaches. Section II defends the notion that interviews, in 
1 particular,  can be a useful research tool in this area. Sections 
III and IV then,  respectively, describe  the design  of and 
summarize some preliminary  findings from a large—scale  interview 
study currently underway at Princeton. This paper is very much a 
progress  report. Since the interviewing still has  9—12 months to 
go, the information reported  in Section IV is but  a fragment  of 
what will ultimately be available. But  it is a fascinating 
fragment, I think. 
I. WHY INTERVIEWS? 
The canonical,  if infrequently followed,  program  of 
scientific research  in economics is to  (a)  develop a theory of 
some phenomenon,  (b)  formulate it in econometric  tens, and then 
(c)  test it with actual data. The theory is then either rejected 
or provisionally  accepted, that is, allowed to suniv  to the 
next test. 
Unfortunately,  this standard program has been singularly 
unsuccessful in the area of wage/price stickiness.  Most 
economists would, I think, agree that we know next to nothing 
about which of several dozen theories of wage—price  stickiness 
are valid and which are not. We might have expected  statistical 
tests to have weeded out the weaker theories by now, especially 
since many  of them have been around a long time.  But, in fact, 
the survivorship  rate rivals that of congressional  elections. 
Why? 
Part of the reason, no doubt, is that economists  are  fonder 
of building theories than of testing them. But I think the main 
reason is that most of the theories are empty in the  following 
2 specific  sense: Either they involve unobservable  variables  in an 
essential way, or they carry no real implications other  than  that 
prices are "sluggish" in some unmeasurable sense, or both. This 
makes  econometric modeling  a blunt——perhaps  even useless-— 
investigative  tool. Let me illustrate. 
To begin  with, think  about what we mean  when  we say that a 
theory  predicts  that prices are "sticky": Often nothing  more  than 
that prices adjust less rapidly than Walrasian  market—clearing 
prices. But since equilibrium price movements  often go 
unmeasured,1  it is hard  to know  whether actual prices are moving 
faster or slower than  this norm. More  important, all the theories 
share exactly the same prediction: that prices are  "sticky" in 
this sense. So how are we to discriminate among them?  It seems 
difficult  even to imagine what a decisive test  would look like, 
much less to carry one out. 
A natural idea is to use each theory to derive other, 
auxiliary predictions,  and then test these. Unfortunately,  often 
there are no such predictions——or at least none that can be 
checked against actual data. One reason is that many of the 
theories  are based on variables that are unobservable  either in 
principle or in practice. 
As an example of the former, consider the theory that firms 
hesitate  to cut prices because they fear that customers will 
interpret a  price  cut as signal that quality has been reduced-- 
when,  in fact, there has been no cuality reduction  (Stiglitz, 
•  1987). Clearly, the theory is predicated on the existence  of 
1. Enough auxiliary assumptions will make them  measurable, 
at least in principle.  But then we are testing a  complex, 
composite hypothesis. 
3 unobservable  quality differences  for,  if consumers  could observe 
quality readily, price would not play a signalling  role. 
As an example  of the latter, consider  the so—called menu 
cost theory  (Mankiw, 1985). In principle,  fixed costs of changing 
prices can be observed and measured.  In practice,  such costs take 
disparate  forms in different firms, and we have no data on their 
magnitude.  So the theory can be tested at best indirectly,  at 
worst not at all.2 
One might argue that theories that make identical 
predictions  are, in an operational sense, the same theory; so it 
does not matter which theory is correct. In fact, however,  it 
does matter. It matters for the value of ecomomics  as a 
descriptive science;  and it matters  for the conduct of 
macroeconomic  policy because not all sources of price rigidity 
open the door  to welfare—improving policies.  For example,  an 
increase in aggregate  demand will probably  raise social welfare 
if a coordination  failure is keeping the price level too high 
(relative to the money  stock, say). But the same  policy  might 
lower social welfare  if prices are rigid because  of sizable real 
costs of price adjustment. 
If it really matters which theory is correct,  but 
comventiomal modes of economic inquiry cannot ajudicate  the 
dispute,  economic science would appear to be in deep trouble. 
Fortumately, one other  common characteristic  of the theories 
2. For example,  the menu coat theory predicts that  a firm 
will never make  "small" price changes, which  appears to be a 
testable proposition.  But does it rule out price increases of 1% 
or 5% or 10%? Without measuring the menu  costs, we cannot answer 
this question. 
4 suggests a way out: Virtually every theory of price rigidity 
describes a chain of reasoning which allegedly  leads the firm to 
conclude that a change in price is inadvisable. 
That is what gave me the idea for an interview  study. If 
actual decisionmakers  really think the way one of these theories 
says, they ought to know that they do. If you ask them  open—ended 
questions like, "Why don't you cut your  prices when  sales 
decline?", you may get shrugs or incoherent answers.  But,  if you 
confront them with  the chain of reasoning they actually  follow, 
they ought to recognize and agree with it.  Conversely,  if they 
explicitly deny the relevance or validity of a particular 
argument, then it is probably not governing their  behavior.  At 
least that is my methodological precept.  If the true reasons for 
price stickiness are buried deep in the subconscjousnesses  of 
price—setters,  interviews will probably miss them. 
II. BUT AREN'T  INTERVIEWS UNRELIABLE? 
Economists,  more so than other social scientists,  are deeply 
skeptical that  you can learn much by asking people. We are 
trained to study behavior by watching what people  (usually in 
markets), not by listening to what they y. 
There are valid grounds for this skepticism.  For example, 
critics will point out that subjects of interviews have  no 
incentive to respond truthfully or thoughtfully;  so 
economicus  might refuse to cooperate  or  even  give misleading 
answers.  If the  respondent  has reason to conceal the truth or 
mislead the interviewer, this objection is probably  a show 
stopper. So,  for example, I would not try to learn  about the 
5 extent of industrial  collusion by interviewing suspected 
colluders.  But, in the case of-price stickiness,  people have no 
particular  reason to conceal the truth.3 As long as people  are 
not pathological  liars, interviews may elicit useful  information. 
The thoughtfulness  problem goes deeper. We all know  the 
billiard—ball  analogy: A good pool player  makes excellent  use of 
the laws of physics  without understanding them, and certainly 
without  being able to articulate them. For this reason, many 
economists  doubt that  much can be learned by asking  "economic 
players"  about how they play the game. But I believe  that more 
pointed questions, posed  in plain English,  can elicit  useful 
answers.  For example,  if you ask a skilled billiards  player 
whether he bases  his shots on the principle  that  the angle of 
incidence equals the angle of reflection, he will probably  look 
at you quizzically.  But, if you take him to the table  and, 
pointing  to the proper angles, ask: "Do you try to make this 
angle the same as that angle?", I imagine he would respond in the 
affirmative. 
Legitimate questions  can also be raised about the size and 
representativeness  of interview samples. Detailed  case studies of 
two or three  companies  can, at most, provide anecdotes, not 
useful statistical  information. And samples that are 
unrepresentative  of the underlying population give  no basis  for 
drawing inferences  about population statistics.  But these are 
familiar problems,  well known to any user of data. They are not 
3. To ensure that this was so,  I abjured any questions  about 
collusion,  oligopolistic  interdependence, limit pricing,  etc.--in 
general,  any question  that might conjure up images of the U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
6 reasons to reject interview evidence out of hand. 
As economists, we should evaluate the usefulness  of the 
interview method  by posing the classic question:  "Relative  to 
what?"  Interviews may be problematic; I do not deny that. But 
theory and econometrics have their limitations,  too-—limitations 
that are  sometimes more severe than we like to admit. 
Theoretical  deductions are often untested  and/or based on 
untested premises.  Worse yet, either the conclusions  or the 
assumptions may be untestable. Econometric evidence  is often 
equivocal and/or  subject to methodological  dispute. On top of 
this comes the litany of standard objections to time series 
econometric evidence: Results are fragile due to small samples, 
multicollinearity,  and the suspected presence  of unit roots; 
there may have  been "regime changes" during  the sample  period; 
appropriate  instruments are scarce or nonexistent; computers  make 
data mining  too easy; and so on and on and on. 
The imperfect knowledge we can pick up from interviews  and 
questionnaires  should therefore not be compared to some 
epistemological  ideal, but to the imperfect knowledge  that 
nonexperimental  scientists can deduce theoretically  or glean from 
econometric studies. By this more reasonable standard  of 
evidence, data culled from interviews certainly  looks 
admissible——especially  if viewed as a supplement to,  rather than 
a replacement for, more conventional modes of economic  inquiry. 
III. TRE RESEARR  DESIGN 
Along with a team of Princeton graduate students,  I have now 
been in the business of interviewing executives  about their 
7 pricing  strategies since August 1988.  Let me briefly  describe the 
research strategy  and some of the tactics. 
Designing the questionnaire: The first step, obviously, was 
to decide which theories  were to be tested and then to turn them 
into questions that ordinary people can understand.  This 
selection process was not entirely objective; nor could it have 
been. In scouring the intellectual waterfront,  I excluded 
theories that sounded silly, or that actually  silly, or that 
seemed too complicated  to be explained tersely in plain English. 
These omissions were not particularly costly; they  did not 
disqualify any of the major competing theories.  (The twelve 
theories  actually tested are described briefly  in the next 
section.) 
Translating the equations  and diagrams  into English proved 
to be quite easy. My first stab at a questionnaire was tried out 
on many  "guinea pigs"——including  economists, business  people, and 
a few scholars involved  in survey research——and  altered in 
literally hundreds  of ways. During this lengthy process of trial 
and error, one of the theories  from my original  list of twelve 
was dropped from consideration  and one new one was added.4 But, 
in general, the current version of the questionnaire  bears a 
striking  resemblance to my original draft. Translating  from 
technical  journalese  into English simply proved  not to be very 
4. The omitted theory is of interest. Greenwald  and Stiglitz 
(1989) argued that  prices vary less than quantities  over business 
cycles because risk—averse  firms are more uncertain  about the 
consequences  (for profits)  of changing prices than about the 
consequences of changing quantities. This idea made sense to me, 
and I thought I could explain it in plain English.  But several 
failures convinced me that the interview method  is simply not 
capable of dealing with this particular theory. This  illustrates 
a general point: Not all theories are testable  by interviews. 
8 difficult. I took this  to be a good omen. 
However,  one important caveat should be entered.  Hot  infrequently,  a question  must be 
rephrased  on the spot to make  the 
respondent understand  it. To do so 
successfully,  an  interviewer must  be 
reasonably articulate, must be able  to think  on his or her feet, and, most 
importantly, must understand  the  economics well enough  to 
paraphrase a question  without 
changing 
its 
meaning.  Thus 
professional pollsters will not do.  Instead, my  interviewers are 
carefully selected Princeton  graduate  students.  Eliciting  cooperation from businesses:  The next  problem  was  getting our feet in the door and getting our questions  answered  by the right people. A  low  response rate  would obviously  raise  fears of 
selectivity bias. 
A  small—scale pilot  study was used both to estimate  the  likely response  rate in a 
large—scale study and to polish  our  questionnaire and 
interviewing techniques. We randomly  selected  16 firms in the 
northeastern United  States and wrote each an  introductory letter 
requesting an interview. We then followed up  with phone calls and/or further mailings  as necessary  and, after  considerable effort, 
successfully interviewed eight  companies.5 
The estimated 50% response rate (with a  standard  error of 12.5%)  struck me as high  enough to  merit  proceeding  to the full study. 
So far, the response  rate in the full study  is running above 60%.  In 
addition, we had no trouble at all making  connections  with  the person  or persons in each company who  could  answer  our  questions. The number of "I don't know" responses  has been  small, 
5. These  eight companies are not included  in the data 
reported below. 
9 and almost never did we hear, "You're asking  the wrong  person." 
Once in the door, we have found people more than  willing  to talk 
frankly. They find the questions interesting, understandable 
(with some exceptions), 
and not invasive of privacy.6  Our 
experience, 
in fact, is that people are often eager to tell us 
things about which  we would never have dared  ask for fear that we 
would appear to be prying.  We do,  of course, promise 
confidentiality. 
GettirtcT  economists to av  attention: The hardest  problem  may 
yet lie ahead: Getting  economists to pay attention  to the 
results. I do not delude  myself into thinking  I have a perfect 
solution. There  are those in our profession whose  beliefs cannot 
be shaken by this  sort  of evidence, maybe not by any evidence. 
But I think  they are a  minority 
and focus my efforts  on the 
persuadable,  though not gullible, majority. 
Several concrete steps have been taken  to increase the 
believability 
of the ultimate findings, whatever  they may be. 
First, I wrote  letters to the originators 
or major  proponents  of 
each theory. The letters explained the nature of the study, 
included a copy  of the relevant portion of the questionnaire, 
asked for suggested  improvements 
in the questions, 
and asked the 
"theorists" to suggest other testable implications 
of their 
theories. Most  responded, 
sometimes offering useful  ideas for 
modifying the questionnaire, 
which were  adopted.  Interestingly, 
however, not one person suggested a  single  further implication 
that could be tested in  the questionnaire. 
This underscores  the 
6. As noted earlier, considerable effort  was expended  to 
guarantee the latter.  10 point I made earlier about the theories  being empty. 
Second, and much  more important, we have taken great pains 
to ensure that the sample of firms is  (a)  large enough to 
generate a database  suitable  for serious statistical  analysis, 
(b)  randomly selected,  and (C) representative of the private, 
for-profit GNP. To my knowledge, this is the first time anything 
like this has ever been  attempted  in an interview  study. Since it 
is what  makes the study unique, it is worth  describing  in some 
detail. 
We purchased  a  tape listing firms with annual sales over $10 
million in the northeastern United States, an area which accounts 
for about 40—45% of U.S. GNP. From this sampling  universe, we 
eliminated government  enterprises and non—profits  on the grounds 
that the theories we wanted  to test were all about  profit—seeking 
firms; this left almost  25,000 firms. We then assigned a sampling 
weight to each firm proportional to its value  added7 and drew a 
random sample of 400 firms, seeking to complete  200 interviews. 
(Remember, the estimated  response rate was 50%.) 
Notice that we excluded any company with annual sales under 
$10 million, even  though  they employ nearly half the labor force. 
Why? Because there are so many of them, and the expense of 
reaching any sizable portion  would be prohibitive.  Clearly, an 
optimal experimental design  would  balance the value  of the 
information obtained  against the costs of obtaining  it and would, 
therefore, undersample very  small companies.8  We approximated 
7. Actually,  we knew  employment for each firm and the ratio  of value  added to employment  for each  two-digit  industry.  8. This presumes that  the study aims to explain  the behavior  of the GNP deflator. 
11 this crudely by not sampling  any companies below the  $10 million 
threshold. Analogous  cost considerations motivated  the 
geographical truncation: costs depend on distance  from Princeton, 
N.J.; benefits do not. 
These two exclusions, however, might compromise  the 
representativeness  of the sample. So we remedied them  as follows. 
Suppose pricing behavior varies geographically  only  because 
industrial structure differs across states, not because,  say, 
California firms are  inherently different from New Jersey  firms. 
Then we can  (and did) create a synthetic national sanmie  by 
reweighting each firm in the Northeast to reflect  national, 
rather than regional,  shares in value added. Firms in industries 
that are overrepresented  in the Northeast,  like banking, were 
appropriately undersampled;  and firms in industries 
underrepresented  in the region, like gas and oil  extraction, were 
correspondingly  oversampled. Thus, the industrial  structure  of 
our sampling frame was made to match that of the nation  as a 
whole. 
While we were  adjusting sampling weights,  it was a simple 
matter to eliminate  (part of)  the potential bias from  omitting 
small firms. For example, any sample that excludes  firms with 
annual sales under $10  million will underweight  retailing.  We 
simply  oversampled the remaining retail firms enough  to assign 
retailing its proper  national weight——and similarly  for every 
other two-digit  industry. In this way, we eliminate  from  our 
sample the portion of any "large—firm bias" that stems  from the 
different industrial structures of small versus large firms. 
12 However,  to the extent that small firms really differ from large 
firms in the sane  industry, the bias remains. 
IV. PRELIMINARY  RESULTS 
The  interviewing  is now in progress. Given  the limited 
clerical  and interviewer resources at my disposal,  we are 
conducting  them in eight waves of approximately  50 letters  (25 
interviews)  each over a  period of about 18 months. As of this 
writing,  the first three waves are nearly complete  and we have 
just begun  the fourth. 
The results reported here are based  on tabulations of the 72 
interviews  completed as of mid—November  1990. Even this partial 
sample is probably  the largest ever used in a study of this 
nature; but it is still too small to permit much  useful 
disaggregation.  So I restrict my attention to national averages 
in this paper. Once the full sample of 200 is available, however, 
there will be a great deal of information about, e.g., how the 
validity  of different  theories varies by industry. 
The questionnaire  comes in two parts and usually takes about 
45—60 minutes to administer. Part A  gathers a variety of factual 
information about each firm, while Part B inquires directly about 
the theories. 
The factual data in Part A  will eventually be used for 
disaggregation,  in cross—tabulations,  and as righthand variables 
in regressions  explaining the validity of the various theories.  I 
make little use of these data in this paper, but one issue is 
important enough to deal with right now: Just how "sticky" are 
13 prices  in the U.S. econony? 
To find out, we ask each firm,  "How often do the prices of 
your most important products  change in a typical year?"  So  far, 
the median response is once per year.9 The distribution  is: 
Frequency of price change 
(tines ner vear  Percent of conpanies 
More than 12  10.1% 
4.01 to 12  4.3% 
2.01 to 4  10.1% 
1.01 to 2  20.3% 
1.0  37.7% 
Less than 1.0  17.4% 
These results offer cheer for Keynesians who model prices as, 
say, rigid for one period or more. I like to joke that  in 
macroeconomic theory we know that the length of "the  period" is 
one  quarter.  According to these data, less than 15%  of the  GNP is 
repriced more frequently than quarterly, and fully 55% is 
repriced no more often than once per year. If we had to pick a 
single abstraction to represent the whole economy,  annual price 
review would appear to be the "right" model. 
From the point of view  of macroeconomic  theory,  frequency of 
price change may not be quite the right question  to ask,  for it 
depends as much on the frequency of shocks as on firms' pricing 
strategies.  We are more interested to know how  long  price 
adjustments  lacy behind  shocks to demand  and  cost.  Table  1 
summarizes  the results from a series of questions of the  form, 
"How much  time normally  elapses after a significant  ____________ 
before you raise  [reduce] your  prices?" We inquire about  four 
9. The mean is not a particularly meaningful  statistic 
because two firms responded "thousands of times." If these are 
excluded, the mean was  still 10 times per year, with a standard 
deviation  of 45.5. 
14 events: an increase  in demand, a decrease  in demand, an increase 
in cost, and a decrease  in cost. The table  shows that, while the 
distributions  are quite spread out, the mean lags cluster in the 
3-4 month range. There is precious little evidence  that prices 
increase faster than they decrease, and virtually  none that firms 
respond to cost shocks more quickly than to demand  shocks. The 
latter came as a surprise to me. 
Part B asks decisionmakers  what they think  about  the 
theories themselves. It is divided into twelve parts. We begin 
each part by succinctly summarizing one of the theories  and then 
posing a question like, "How important is this  in explaining  the 
speed of price  adjustment  in your company?"10  Respondents  answer 
freely in their own  words,  but interviewers are instructed  to 
code the responses  on the following four—point  scale: 
1 =  totally unimportant 
2  =  of minor importance 
3  = moderately  important 
4  =  very important 
N  =  don't know  or cannot answer 
This scale resembles the typical grading system used at 
universities,  but we should expect the  "grades"  to be more 
compressed. At the high  end, no theory is ever going  to score a 
perfect 4.0. Indeed,  a theory rated "very important" by half the 
firms and "of minor importance" by the other half would be a fine 
theory indeed. Thus I would interpret a score of 3.0 as quite 
good, by no means the equivalent of a B. At the low end, a score 
of 1.0 would mean that every firm in  the sample  dismissed  the 
10.  For many theories, there is a preliminary  factual 
question. For example, before we ask whether judging quality by 
price deters price increases, we first ask whether the  firm 
thinks  its customers actually  do judge quality by price. 
15 theory out of hand. This is not a grade of D, but a kind of 
super—F.  Indeed, any score below 1.5 is a remarkably  poor 
performance. 
If the respondent says a  particular idea is "totally 
unimportant" to the speed of price adjustment, we ask no further 
questions  about that theory. Otherwise, we ask a variety of 
followup questions——sometimes many, sometimes few——geared 
specifically to each theory. In this interim report,  I ignore 
most  of the followup questions and concentrate on the main 
questions about the perceived validity of each theory.  But one 
group of followup questions merits a brief mention. 
For nine of the twelve theories, we included  an "asymmetry" 
question  asking whether prices are more inflexible  upward or 
downward. The questions were posed differently  for each theory, 
and so defy any short tabulation or summary. With the Nixonian 
preface  "Trust me!," I will summarize the responses  in two brief 
statements:  (1) We have so far found only very weak  evidence  for 
asymmetry.  (2)  The balance of this evidence suggests  that prices 
are actually slicthtly  stickier upward than downward.  But this 
question will clearly have to be revisited when  more  data are  in. 
Table 2 summarizes the central results on the validity  of 
the twelve  theories, as perceived by actual decisionziakers, 
ranked in order of popularity. The second column names the 
theories briefly,  and sometimes cryptically.  (Explanations 
follow.) The third column records the mean  score  on the above- 
mentioned  four—point scale; remember that we expect  most  theories 
to score in the 1.5—3.0 range. We can interpret  a rating of 1 or 
16 2 as meaning that the  firm rejects  the theory  as an explanation 
of price rigidity,  and a rating of 3 or 4 as meaning  that the 
firm accepts  it.  So the fourth column gives the percentage  of 
respondents that rate the theory as 3 or higher——an  indicator of 
the fraction of the private,  for—profit GNP to which this theory 
applies)-1-  The two alternative ways of ranking  the theories 
agree closely. Ranked  from best to worst by mean  score, the 
theories are: 
1. Atop the  list is a theory cryptically  denoted delivery 
lags/service.  The  idea,  which I attribute to Dennis Carlton 
(1990),  is that price is but one of several elements  that matter 
to buyers. Rather than cut  (raise)  prices when demand is low 
(high), firms might  prefer  to shorten (lengthen) deliver  lags or 
provide more  (less) auxiliary services. Canton emphasized 
delivery lags; but many  of our respondents point  to other  aspects 
of service. The mean score for this theory  so far is a healthy 
2.86. Seventy-six percent  of the firms accept the premise,  and 
65% say it is an important factor in slowing down price 
adjustments. 
2. Coordination  failure: This very old idea has been revived 
and formalized  in recent New Keynesian theorizing  by, among 
others, Cooper and John  (1988) and Ball and Romer (1987). The 
notion is that  firms might like to. raise or lower prices, but 
hesitate to do so unless and until other firms move first. Once 
other firms move, they follow quickly. The mean score for this 
11.  Because sampling weights were proportional  to value 
added, no further weighting  of the sample is required  at this 
time. 'Votes" from small firms and large firms count equally. 
17 theory of 2.85 and its "acceptance rate" of 66% are quite high 
indeed. 
3. Cost—based  pricing connotes another very old Keynesian 
idea.  This  is the theory that prices are based on costs  (of labor 
and purchased materials)  and do not rise until  costs rise. When 
combined with the notion that the prices of upstream  firms become 
the costs of  downstream  firms  as cost increases  percolate through 
the  input—output table  (Gordon 1981,  Blanchard 1983),  this  can 
lead to substantial lags  in price adjustment. Well  over half the 
firms in our sample so far rate this a  moderately  or very 
important  factor in explaining the  speed of price adjustment; the 
mean  score is 2.72. 
4.  Implicit contracts  rounds out the top four. This phrase 
connotes Okun's  (1981)  "invisible handshake" theory that firms 
have implicit understandings with their customers  which proscribe 
price increases when  markets are tight. Though  this theory 
obtains an average score of 2.52, it elicits the most  bimodal 
responses of any. Sixty—one percent of the sample accepts  the 
premise that implicit contracts exist. Within  this sector, 
respondents generally  think that such contracts  are an important 
source of price stickiness. The mean response  among those not 
responding  "totally unimportant" is a stunning  3.42. 
5. Exolicit nominal contracts refers to the naive Keynesian 
idea that written  contracts prohibit price adjustments  while  they 
remain in force. Most firms have such contracts,  for at least 
some of their products; but discounting appears  to be common. Our 
rough estimate  is that this is an important factor in price 
stickiness for only about 40% of the economy.  The mean  score 
18 (counting firms with  no explicit contracts  as  l's)  is 2.29. 
6. A  number  of theorists have suggested that firms incur 
special costs  of price adlustsent whenever  they change prices. 
Both menu costs and convex costs are lumped together  under this 
rubric,12 but  followup questions distinguish between the two. 
About 70% of all firms report that they have such costs. But 
fewer than half think  them an important factor in slowing down 
price responses. The average score is 2.28. 
7. According  to a very old idea revived  in the mid-1980s, 
demand curves become less elastic when  they  shift in  (Shapiro, 
1988). Such  procyclical behavior  of elasticity  would lead to 
countercyclical  markups which would, in turn, rigidify prices. 
This  is another case where the premise is often accepted  (59% of 
the time), but the idea is thought to be a significant source of 
price rigidity  in only 36% of the cases. The average score is 
just below 2, which  connotes minor importance. 
8.  Pricinc points refers to a somewhat  "non—economic"  idea 
advanced by Anil Kayshap  (1987): that certain prices--such  as 
$19.95 for a  shirt——are psychological barriers which firms  are 
reluctant to cross. This also scores 1.97  on average. Again,  a 
majority of the  firms (53%)  accepts the premise; but only  a third 
think it explains much  price stickiness. 
9. Inventories  refers to the theory that, when  demand rises 
(falls), firms draw down (build up) their inventories rather than 
increase  (decrease) prices (Blinder, 1982). Note  that  this 
question  is not asked of service companies, so the sample size so 
12. On the former, see Mankiw  (1985); on the later, see 
Rotemberg  (1982). 
19 far is only 33.  Of these, however, fewer than a third think 
inventories a significant factor in deterring  price adjustments. 
The average score is a low 1.72. 
10.  Constant marcinal  cost is shorthand for the simple model 
advanced by Robert Hall  (1986):  that prices are  sticky because 
both marginal  costs and markups are constant over  the business 
cycle. Since its ratings are so poor——a mean score of only  1.56 
and an acceptance  rate of just l9%--I should explain  how we posed 
the question. First, we asked respondents how their "variable 
costs of producing  additional units" (our plain—English 
translation of marginal  cost) behave as output rises. Only 42% of 
the sample reported that their MC was constant.13  The 58% who 
said MC was rising  (13% of the sample) or falling  (45%)  were 
deemed to have automatically  rated the theory as totally 
unimportant. Among the minority of firms reporting  constant 
marginal  cost, however,  about 60% said that the constancy  of MC 
was totally unimportant  or of minor importance  in explaining 
their speed of price  adjustment. 
11.  Hierarchies  is a code word for a "theory"  not on my 
original  list of 12,  for it does not come from the academic 
literature. Rather, it was suggested to us by an executive  of a 
large corporation. The simple idea is that price  changes  are 
slowed down by the difficulty of getting a large, hierarchical 
organization to take action. Its low average score of 1.54 nay 
appear unsurprising,  since it should apply only to giant 
13. This includes  those who said MC is constant  except at 
certain discrete points. For example, a fast—food  chain  may have 
constant MC until  it must open a new store to serve its expanding 
customer base, and then have constant MC thereafter. 
20 companies.  But, even among firms with annual sales over $100 
million,  its mean score is only 1.66. 
12. The worst theory, according to our practitioners,  is 
judging guality by price, a theory I have mentioned before.  It 
obtains a paltry  mean  score of 1.45 and an acceptance rate of 
just 12%. Less  than  a quarter of the firms in the Sample so far 
think  their  customers would "interpret a price cut as a signal 
that the quality of the product has been reduced." In our 
tabulations,  we count  the others as rating the theory "totally 
unimportant."  However, among the minority  of firms whose 
customers  judge quality by price, roughly 45% say it is a 
moderately  or very important factor in discouraging  price 
increases.  Thus this theory may be of some importance within  a 
narrow sector of the economy. 
In summary, it seems to me that the theories divide 
themselves into three groups. The top four listed above 
distinguish  themselves as especially promising and/or applicable 
to the U.S.  economy. The leading theory  (by a slim margin)-— 
delivery  lags/service-—has not received the attention  it 
deserves. The other three look to me  decidedly Keynesian.  Cost- 
based pricing  is,  of course, old—fashioned  Keynesian stuff. 
Coordination  failure is a major strain of New Keynesian 
theorizing.  And Okun's  (1971)  "invisible handshake"  is by now 
part of the Keynesian tradition. 
At the bottom of the list, we find four theories which 
appear  to be rejected by our respondents. Two of them have 
enjoyed great popularity in the 1980s. If practitioners  are to be 
believed,  marginal costs are constant in only a minority of 
21 industries. And judging quality by price appears to be neither a 
common nor an important phenomenon. 
It is true that these results are based on only 36% of the 
ultimate  sample. But I will be surprised  if the rankings  change 
dramatically as more data come in; 72 observations  is sufficient 
to answer most questions about national  averages.-4 The payoff  to 
a large sample will come later, when I have enough data to answer 
disaggregated  questions like, "What kinds of firms make 
'invisible handshakes' with their customers?"  I will report 
information of that sort at a later date. 
14.  I first tabulated these results when  we had only 46 
completed interviews. That ranking was similar to that  reported 
here. 
22 Table 1 
Lags in Price Adjustment(1) 
question:  How much time normally elapses after a significant 
________________________ before you raise  (reduce) your prices? 
Mean Lag 
Event  (in months)  Standard  Deviation 
Increase in demand  3.23  2.93 
Decrease in demand  3.60  3.93 
Increase in costs  3.17  2.90 
Decrease  in costs  3.97  4.47 
(1)Based on 72 interviews completed as of mid—November  1990. 
23 Table 2 
Summary Evaluation  of Theories1 
Percentage  "3" 
Rank  Theory  Mean Score  or higher 
1  Delivery  lags/service  2.86  65% 
2  Coordination  failure  2.85  66% 
3  Cost—based pricing  2.72  57% 
4  Implicit  contracts  2.52  56% 
5  Explicit  nominal contracts 2.29  40% 
6  Costs of price adjustment  2.28  43% 
7  Procyclical  elasticity  1.97  36% 
8  Pricing points  1.97  33% 
9  Inventories  1.72  28% 
10  Constant  marginal  cost  1.56  19% 
11  Hierarchies  1.54  18% 
12  Judging  quality  by  price  1.45  12% 
(1)Based on 72 interviews completed as of mid—November  1990. 
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